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Abstract 
The actual transition from IPv4 to IPv6 requires network 
administrators to become aware of the next generation 
protocol and the associated risk problems.Due to the scale and 
complexity of current internet architecture how to protect 
from the existing investment and reduce the negative influence 
to users and service providers during the transition from IPv4 
to IPv6 is a very important future topic for the advanced 
version of an internet architecture.This  paper summarizes and 
compares the IPv6 transition mechanism methods like Dual 
Stack,Tunneling issues like IPv6 Automatic tunneling and 
manually configured tunneling considerations, the IPv6 
transition scenarios,IPv6 transition security 
problems,highlights IPv6 and IPv4 threat review with 
automatic tunneling and configuration tunneling 
considerations.In this paper we have proposed a transitional 
threat model for automatic tunneling and a configuration 
tunneling that could be followed by the University of 
Mysore(UoM),to estimate automatic tunneling and a manually 
configured tunneling threat review issues.Furthermore,there 
are different tunneling mechanisms such as:IPv6 over IPv4 
GRE Tunnel,Tunnel broker,Automatic IPv4–Compatible 
Tunnel and Automatic 6-to-4 Tunnel and also outlines many of 
the common known threats against IPv6 and then it compares 
and contrast how these threats are similar ones,might affect an 
IPv6 network. 
Keywords: Automatic Tunneling; Configuration Tunneling; 
IPv6 Transition; IPv6 Tunneling; IPv6 Security. 
I. Introduction 
In the last 20 years,the internet undertook a huge and 
unexpected explosion of growth [63].There was an effort to 
develop a protocol that can solve problems in the current 
Internet protocol which is in the Internet protocol version 
4(IPv4).It was soon realized that the current internet 
protocol the IPv4,would be inadequate to handle the 
internet’s continued growth.The internet Engineering task 
force(IETF) was started to develop a new protocol in 1990’s 
and it was launched IPng in 1993 which is stand for Internet 
Protocol Next Generation.So a new generation of the 
Internet Protocol(IPv6)was developed [7],allowing for 
millions  of more IP addresses.The person in charge of IPng 
area of the IETF recommended  the  idea of IPv6 in 1994 at 
Toronto IETF[1].But mainly due to the scarcity of  
unallocated IPv4 address the IPv4 protocol cannot satisfy all 
the requirements of the always expanding Internet because 
however its 32 bit address space being rapidly 
exhausted[2]alternative solutions are again  needed[3].The 
long term solution is a transition to IPv6[5]which is 
designed to be an evolutionary step from IPv4 where the 
most transport and application–layer protocol need little or 
no modification to the work.The deployment of NAT[3]can 
alleviate this problem to some extend but it breaks end to 
end characteristic of the Internet,and it cannot resolve the 
problems like depletion(exhaustion) of IPv4 addresses.IPv6 
protocol has 128-bit addresses instead 32 bit IPv4 
addresses,however the migration from IPv4 to IPv6 is an 
instant is impossible because of the huge size of the Internet 
and of the great number of IPv4 users[16].Moreover, many 
organizations are becoming more and more dependent on 
the Internet for their daily work,and they therefore cannot 
tolerate downtime for the replacement of the IP 
protocol.IPv6 has some transition methods or techniques  
that permit end user to put into operation slowly but surely 
provides a high level of interoperation between both 
protocols IPv4 and IPv6.The IPv6 has some transition 
methods or techniques that permit end user to put into 
operation IPv6 slowly but surely and provides a high level 
of interoperation between both the protocols IPv4 and 
IPv6.The current IPv4 based Internet is so large and 
complex that the migration from IPv4 to IPv6 not as simple 
as the transition from NCP network to TCP/IP in 1983and 
also will take so many years to occur very smoothly[63]. 
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can install it as a software which upgrade in most Internet 
machines,and it can work smoothly with the current IPv4 
data.  
This Journal paper is intended to provide a review of the 
most common threats in IPv6.This paper also can extend by 
investigating the additional threats through the deployment 
of IPv6 including those associated with the various 
transition mechanisms available with specific emphasis on 
Automatic tunneling and Configuration tunneling.Since 
there are no transitional networks(ISP’s)IPv6 ready yet in 
INDIA,therefore,to get going deploying IPv6 we need 
transition techniques,since there is no complete world wide 
IPv6 network infrastructure.We should look at this stage as 
strategic vision, and we should look at the existing of IPv4 
and IPv6 network infrastructure as necessary situation 
before complete migration to IPv6.The scarcity of 
information on the subject of IPv6 migration costs,merged 
with the reality that many organizations are not sold on the 
supposed benefits offered by the IPv6,is making the case for 
upgrading difficult to argue[2].It is quite obvious that 
changing from IPv4 to IPv6 is very costly,since many 
current network applications running on IPv4 .  
This paper presents a comprehensive explanation about the 
current status of research on IPv6 Transition 
mechanisms,Tunneling types like Automatic Tunneling and 
Manually configured tunneling etc,Tunneling types threat 
reviews,IPv6 Security aspects,Threat review model and 
indicates the prospect of the future research.The paper   is 
organized as follows: We briefly described the Theoretical 
considerations of IPv6 Transition issues in Section 2.We 
described IPv6 to IPv4 threat review in section 3.We discuss 
a brief overview of IPv6 Automatic Tunneling and 
Configuration tunneling mechanism considerations in 
section 4.We discussed prototype which explains the 
Automatic tunneling,Configuring tunneling review research 
in section 5.We describe our research approach 
recommendations on IPv6 tunneling threat types in section 
6.In section 7 we will learn the current and future Innovative 
research challenges of IPv6 threat issues for 
researchers,finally we concluded the whole paper in section 
8. 
II.Theoretical Consideration. 
A .Types of Transition Strategies in IPv6 
The key elements of these transition technologies are dual 
stack and configuration tunneling.The below figure-1 shows 
description of the different IPv6 tunneling scenarios and  
their configurations which are explained by using some of 
the available commands.The main important IPv6 transition 
techniques are Dual-Stack,Tunneling Techniques,and 
Header translation. 
 
 Fig .I.The IPv6 Transition Mechanisms. 
B. Introduction to Tunnels  
A tunnel is a bidirectional point –to-point link between two 
network endpoints.Data is carried through the tunnel using a 
process called encapsulation in which IPv6 packet is carried 
inside an IPv4 packet which makes IPv4 as a Data Link 
layer with respect to IPv6 packet transport. The term 
“tunneling” refers to a means to encapsulate one version of 
IP  in another so the packets can be sent over a backbone 
that does not support the encapsulated IP version. For 
example,when two isolated IPv6 networks need to 
communicate over an  IPv4 network,dual-stack routers at 
the network edges can be used to set up a tunnel which 
encapsulates the IPv6 packets within IPv4,allowing the IPv6 
systems to communicate without having to upgrade the IPv4 
network infrastructure that exists between the networks. 
This mechanism can be used when two nodes that use same 
protocol wants to communicate over a network that uses 
another network protocol.The tunneling process involves 
three steps:encapsulation,decapsulation,and tunnel 
management.It also requires two tunnel end-points,which in 
general case are dual-stack IPv4/IPv6 nodes,to handle the 
encapsulation and decapsulation.There will be performance 
issues associated with tunneling,both for the latency in en/de 
capsulation and the additional bandwidth used.Tunneling is 
one of the key deployment strategies for both service 
providers and enterprises during the period of IPv4 and IPv6 
coexistence.Fig-2 Shows the deployment of IPv6 over IPv4 
tunnels. 
   Fig.II.The Deploying an IPv6 over IPv4 Tunnels. 
                                            
Tunneling is a strategy used when two computers using 
IPv6 want to communicate with each other and the packet 
must pass through a region that uses IPv4.To pass through 
this region,the packet must have an IPv4 address.So the 
IPv6 packet is encapsulated in an IPv4 packet when it enters 
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the region,and it leaves its capsule when it exists the region.It 
seems as if the packet IPv6 packet goes through a tunnel at 
one end and emerges at the other end [10].To make it clear 
that the IPv4 packet is carrying an IPv6 packet as data,the 
protocol value is set to 41[see Figure-2]Although IPv6 Dual 
Stack,IPv6 Tunneling,IPv6 Header Translation,are providing 
with us with transition solution but still it is not 
complete,there are still some other issues we should consider 
to get complete solution for transitioning.Tunneling 
techniques are broadly divided into two types,first one is an 
automatic tunneling and second one is configuration 
tunneling[Ref-Figure-4].The tunneling technique we can use 
the compatible addresses discussed as shown in the below 
Figure-3.A compatible address is an address of 96 bits of 
zero followed by 32 bits of IPv4 address.It is used when a 
computer using IPv6 wants to send a message to another 
computer using IPv6.However suppose the packet passes 
through a region where the networks are still using IPv4.The 
sender must use the IPv4-compatible address to facilitate the 
passage of the packet through the IPv4 region.For example 
the IPv4 address 2.13.17.14 becomes 0::020D:110E.The IPv4 




Fig.III.The IPv6 Compatible Address. 
 
C. Types of Tunneling Mechanisms. 
 
 
Fig.IV.The  IPv6 Tunneling Mechanisms. 
D.An Automatic Tunneling 
If the receiving host when it uses a compatible IPv6 
address,tunneling occurs automatically without any 
reconfiguration.In automatic tunneling,the sender sends the 
receiver an IPv6 packet using the IPv6 compatible address 
as the destination address.When the packet reaches 
boundary of the IPv4 network,the router encapsulates it in 
an IPv4 packet,which should have an IPv4 address.To get 
this address,the router extracts the IPv4 address embedded 
in the IPv6 address.The packet then travels the rest of its 
journey as an IPv4 packet.The destination host,which is 
using a dual stack,now receives an IPv4 packet.Recognizing 
its IPv4 address, it reads the header,and finds that the packet 
is carrying an IPv4 packet.It then passes the packet to the 
IPv6 software for processing.(SeeFigure-5)[10].  
 




The tunnel point addresses are determined by the 
configuration information that is stored at the encapsulating 
end point hence the name configured tunneling.The other 
name for a configured tunneling is an explicit tunneling.If 
the receiving host does not support an IPv6 –compatible 
address,the sender receives no compatible IPv6 address 
from the DNS.In a configuration the sender sends the IPv6 
packet with the receiver’s no compatible IPv6 address, 
however the packet cannot pass through the IPv4 region 
without first being encapsulated in an IPv4 packet.The two 
routers at the boundary of the IPv4–region are configured to 
pass the packet encapsulated in an IPv4 packet.The router at 
one end sends the IPv4 packet with its own IPv4 address as 
the source address and the other router’s address as the 
destination.The router receiver’s the packet,decapsulates the 
IPv6 packet, and sends it to the destination host.The 
destination host then receives the packet in IPv6 format and 
processes it [10](SeeFigure-6).
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Fig .VI.The IPv6 Configuration Tunneling. 
Configuration and Automatic tunnels can be defined to go 
between router-to-router,Host–to-Host,Host-to-Router,and 
Router–to-Host but are most likely to be used in a router–to-
router configuration. 
 
                        
F.IPv6 over IPv4 GRE Tunneling. 
 
Fig.VII.The IPv6 over IPv4 GRE Tunneling. 
The IPv6 over IPv4 GRE tunnel is a variety of tunneling 
mechanism in a TCP/IP protocol suite.This is also a type of 
GRE tunneling technique that is designed to provide the 
services necessary to implement standard point-to-point 
encapsulation scheme.GRE tunnels are the links between end 
points with a separate tunnel for each link as similar to IPv6 
manually configuration tunnel.However each tunnel is not 
tied to a specific passenger or transport protocol but in this 
situation they carry IPv6 as the passenger protocol over GRE 
as the carrier protocol.The Fig-7 Shows how to configure 
IPv6 over IPv4 GRE tunnel.  
 G.Configuration Tunneling Scenarios:  
    1.Router –to-Router Tunneling Configuration: During 
the migration,the tunneling technique can be used in the 
following   ways: 
1.Router-to-router:IPv6/IPv4 routers interconnected by an 
IPv4 infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between 
themselves.
 
 Fig.VIII. The Router –to-Router Tunneling Configuration. 
    2.Host–to-Router:IPv6/IPv4 hosts can tunnel IPv6 packets to 
an intermediary IPv6/IPv4 router that can be reached via an 
IPv4 Infrastructure. 
 
Fig.IX.The Host–to-Router Tunneling Configuration. 
3.Host-to-Host:IPv4/IPv6 hosts that are interconnected by    
an IPv4 infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between 
themselves.                                                                          
 
4.Router-to-Host:IPv6/IPv4 routers can use tunnels to reach 
an IPv4/IPv6 host via an IPv4 infrastructure. 
 
Fig.XI.The Router–to-Host Tunneling Configuration. 
 
Fig.X.The Host–to-Host Tunneling Configuration. 
III.The IPv6 to IPv4 Threat review 
A .Types of Threats in IPv6 Security                               
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Networks threats are broadly divided into two types.The 
first type of threat is passive threat and active threats.The 
term passive indicates that the attacker does not attempt to 
perform any modifications to the data [15].In fact,this is also 
why passive attacks are harder to detect, where the active 
attacks are based on modifications of the original message 
in some manner or in creation of a false message. 
IV. A brief overview of IPv6 Automatic Tunneling and 
Configuration tunneling mechanism considerations. 
    Several approaches to transition from IPv4 to IPv6 
networks exist. These approaches are broadly divided into 
three  following   types[Ref-Figure-1].  
1. Dual Stack, 2.Tunneling, 3.Translation. 
A.IPv6 and IPv4 Threat Issues and Observations   
With regard to the IPv6 tunneling technologies and 
firewalls,if the Network designer does not consider IPv6 
tunneling when defining security policy,unauthorized could 
possibly traverse the firewall in tunnels.This is similar to the 
issue with instant messaging(IM)and file sharing 
applications using TCP port 80 out of organizations with 
IPv4.According to some transition issues automatic 
tunneling mechanisms are susceptible to packet forgery and 
DOS attacks.  
1.With regard to IPv6 Tunneling technologies and 
Firewalls,if the network designer does not consider IPv6 
Tunneling when defining security policy,unauthorized 
traffic could possibly traverse the firewalls in tunnels.This is 
similar to the issue with instant messaging(IM) and file 
sharing applications using TCP port 80 out of organizations. 
2.All ready we know that an automatic tunneling 
mechanisms are susceptible to packet forgery and DoS 
attacks.These risks are the same as in IPv4,but increase the 
number of paths of exploitation for adversaries. 
3.According to the Network designer while deploying 
Automatic tunneling or Configuration tunneling,the 
tunneling overlays are considered non broadcast multi-
access (NBMA) networks to IPv6 and require the network 
designer to consider this fact in the network security design.  
4.An Automatic Tunneling with DoS threats and third 
parties has introduced by Relay translation technologies. 
These risks do not change from IPv4,but do provide new 
avenues for exploitation [13], either for external customers 
or internal customers the relays avenues can be limited by 
restricting the routing advertisements. 
5.IPv6 to IPv4 and translation and relay techniques can 
defeat active defense trace back efforts hiding the origin of 
an attack. 
6.Translation techniques outlined for IPv6 have been 
analyzed as shown to suffer from similar spoofing and DoS 
issues as IPv4 only translation technologies [14]. 
7.Static IPv6 in IPv4 Tunneling is preferred because explicit 
allows and disallows are in the policy on edge devices. 
The below mentioned Figure-13 Shows a study that has 
been conducted by University of Mysore to estimate the 
IPv6 to IPv4 threats review with the help of automatic 
tunneling and Configuration tunneling issues. 
 
Fig. XIII.Threat differences between  IPv4 and IPv6 with Tunneling 
Techniques.                                                   
                                                     V.Prototype 
5.1. Threat Analysis due to Transition Mechanisms 
Threat modeling (or analysis) is essential in order to help us 
to develop a security model than can focus or protecting 
against certain threats and manage the related 
assumptions.One methodology to discover and list all 
possible security attacks against a system is known as attack 
trees.To create an attack tree we represent attacks against a 
system in a tree structure, the attack goals as root nodes and 
the different sub goals necessary to achieve them as their 
leaf nodes.Figure-14 represents the general threat categories 
we have identified against network convergence 
architectures namely attack on the network processes are 
responsible for IPv6 transition,Dual stack,Automatic 
tunneling and Configuration tunneling threats.Dual Stack 
threats are totally different from the IPv6 Tunneling 
techniques like an automatic tunneling and Configuration 
tunneling,manually configured tunneling,Static tunneling 
etc.As we have discussed there are large number of 
transition mechanisms to deploy IPv6 but broadly be 
categorized into,Dual Stack,Tunneling(Automatic,Manual 
Configuration),and Translation Header. 
 
Fig.XIV.General Threat categories for IPv6 Tunneling. 
 The problems are identified when IPv6 is tunneled over 
IPv4 encapsulated in UDP as UDP is usually allowed to 
pass through NATS and Firewalls [59].Consequently 
allowing an attacker to punch holes with in the security 
infrastructure.The First and Second authors of this paper 
recommends that if the necessary security measures cannot 
be taken ,tunneled traffic should be used with caution if not 
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completely blocked.To provide ingress and egress filtering 
of known IPv6 tunneled traffic, perimeter firewalls should 
block all inbound and outbound IPv4 protocol 41 traffic.For 
circumstances where Protocol 41 is not blocked it can easily 
be detected and monitored by the open-source IPv4 IDS 
Snort.During the development of the IP6-to-IPv4 threat 
model we have identified that several attacks lead to 
other attacks which we have previously included and 
analyzed. These are represented in the tree as identical 
nodes in different locations. 
5.2. Security IPv6 Deployment for Automatic Tunneling and 
Configuration Tunneling. 
A.Specific of IPv6 Tunneling Deployment  
Considering the issues surrounding IPv6 firewalls,Figure-15 
demonstrates how all traffic originating from the Internet 
must be split up into its corresponding protocols.Each 
protocol must then be inspected and filtered independently 
based on a consistent policy before being forwarded to their 
respective destinations. Under most circumstances, the 
deployment model will be much more complex and will 
probably consist of some hybrid deployment structure, which 
may include some element of tunneling. For these situations, 
the principle should remain the same but the model should be 
adapted accordingly. 
D.Avoid IPv6 Tunneling or be aware of the security 
consequences. 
I.6 to 4 does not support source address filtering.,2.Teredo 
punches holes into the NAT device,3.Any Tunneling 
 
        Fig.XV.Basic  Security model for IPv6 Tunneling types. 
B. Predicted Security models for IPv6 Tunneling.  
Research is pushing the way towards reducing the 
restrictions that are preventing widespread deployment of 
Insect.Advances in the development of a PKI solution [49] to 
offer basic and advanced certification services,supplies a 
solution to allow client systems or end entities in one 
administrative domain to communicate securely with client 
systems or end users in another administrative domain.This 
can be extended to support multi-domain IPv6 scenarios 
through the deployment of cross-certification modules, thus 
reducing the key management problems. In addition to this, 
policy-based management systems are being implemented to 
solve the challenges presented by large-scale IPSec policy 
deployment across many network elements through the use 
of a centralized policy server which controls policy targets 
[50].These advances are in their preliminary stages but 
demonstrate the options available to start solving the 
limitations of widespread IPSec deployment within IPv6. 
C.The more complicated the IPv6 transition/coexistence 
becomes the greater danger that security issues will be 
introduced either   
1.In the mechanisms themselves, in the interaction between 
mechanisms or by introducing unsecured paths through 
multiple mechanisms. 
mechanism may be prone to spoofing, 4.With any tunneling 
mechanism we trust the relay-servers[60]. 
E.Block IPv6 Tunneling Protocols. 
The networking and security communities have invested 
time and energy in ensuring that IPv6 is a security-enabled 
protocol. However, one of the greatest risks inherent in the 
migration is the use of tunneling protocols to support the 
transition to IPv6.These protocols allow the encapsulation of 
IPv6 traffic in an IPv4 data stream for routing through non-
compliant devices.Therefore, it's possible that users on your 
network can begin running IPv6 using these tunneling 
protocols before you're ready to officially support it in 
production.If this is a concern,block IPv6 tunneling 
protocols (including SIT, ISATAP, 6to4 and others) at your 
perimeter.To block IPv6 Tunneling protocols we have to do 
two importantly configure the network by using upgrade our 
edge firewall, proxy and IDS to include IPv6 and tunneled 
IPv6 functionality, Drop all outbound IPv4 based UDP 
traffic with source or destination port 3544 and IPv4 
protocol 41 packets[60].Along with these it includes leading 
threats of IPv4 DoS and DDoS attack.IPv6 DoS are related 
to Neighbor discovery(ND) protocol.ND includes various 
problems like address resolution, Neighbor unreachability 
detection, Duplicate address detection, and router 
discovery.These types of threats are controlled by 
IPSec[60].DDOS attacks are based on four representative 
modes like TCP-flood ,UDP-flood,ICMP-flood, Smurf 
attack.TCP involves three way handshake mechanism of the 
TCP protocol.The attacking node sends a series of SYN 
request to the victim with spoofed address.The victim will 
send SYN/ACK as response and wait some time for an 
ACK.Because of spoofed source address there is no ACK 
return. It causes the connection queue and memory buffer to 
fill up [62]. 
F.Specific for Teredo: Network 
To restrict the outgoing traffic (white listing) then block 
UDP port 3544,then for Windows OS disable the teredo 
client, to disable the teredo client we have to use command 
like: netsh interface teredo set state disabled.To register 
teredo client the specific directory is 
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Services\Tcpip6 \parameters [60]. 
5.3. IPv6-Threats –IPv6 Tunneling. 
In Tunneling based methods,when a tunnel end point 
receives an encapsulated data packet,it decapsulates the 
packet and sends it to the other local forwarding scheme. 
The security threats in tunneling mechanisms,take IPv6 over 
IPv4 tunnel are mostly caused by the spoofed encapsulated 
packet sent by the attackers in an IPv4 networks.As shown 
in Figure-16,the target of attacks can be either a normal 
IPv6 node or the tunnel end point [25] 
 
Fig.XVI.Security issues of various tunneling  types. 
5.4. The Security issues in IPv6 tunneling are as follows. 
1. The hard to trace back : 
Case-1:IPv4 networking node can make an attack on 
IPv6 node(network):The attackers(hackers) in IPv4 
networks can make an attack on the IPv6 nodes through the 
6to4 router(tunnel) end point by forwarding a spoofed 
encapsulated messages(Packets).Therefore here in this 
situation it is very difficult to trace back(Refer Fig-16). 
Case-2:IPv6 networking node can make an attack on 
IPv6 network (node):In this type the hacker in IPv6 
networks can make an attack on the IPv6 network through 
6-to4 relay end point and 6-to4 router by sending a spoofed 
encapsulated packets.In this case also its very difficult to 
trace back.(Refer  Fig-16) 
2. Potential reflect- DoS attack on Destination 
Host (Refer-Fig-16):The hackers in the IPv4 networks can 
make a reflect–DoS attack to a normal IPv6 network (node) 
through the 6-to-4 router (tunnel) end point by sending the 
encapsulated packets with the spoofed IPv6 source address 
as the specific IPv6 node. 
3. Cheat by a Hacker with the IPv6 Neighbor 
Discovery (ND) message: Whenever IPv4 network is 
treated as the link layer in tunneling technology,the hackers 
in the IPv4 networks can cheat and DoS attack the tunnel 
end point by sending encapsulated IPv6 neighbor discovery 
(ND)messages with a spoofed IPv6 link local address.The 
automatic tunneling techniques like 6-to 4 and Teredo get 
the information of remote tunnel end point from the certain 
IPv6 packets.  
4. Distributed Reflection DoS: This type of 
attack can be performed if the very large number of nodes 
whenever involved in the sending spoofed traffic with same 
source IPv6 addresses. 
5. If the Destination host generates replies by 
using TCP SYN ACK ,TCP RST,ICMPv6 Echo 
reply,ICMPv6 Destination unreachable etc):In this case of 
attack the victim host is used as a reflector for attacking 
another victim connected to the network by using a spoofed 
source(Refer Fig-16). 
6. Spoofing in IPv4 with 6 to 4: In this type of 
attack 6 to 4 tunneling spoofed traffic can be injected from 
IPv4 into IPv6.The IPv4 spoofed address acts like an IPv4 
source, 6 to 4 relay any cast (192.88.99.1) acts like an IPv4 
destination. The 2002::spoofed source address acts like an 
IPv4 destination. 
7. IPv6 source address and the valid destination 




Fig.XVII.Spoofing in an IPv4 with 6 to 4. 
7.Theft of Service: During the IPv6 transition period, 
many sites will use IPv6 tunnels over IPv4 infrastructure. 
Sometimes we will use static or automatic tunnels. The 6 to 
4 relay administrators will often want to use some policy 
limit the use of the relay to specific 6 to 4 sites or specific 
IPv6 sites.However some users may be able to use the 
service regardless of these controls by configuring the 
address of the relay using its IPv4 address instead of 
192.88.99.1 or using the router header to route the IPv6 
packets to reach specific 6 to 4  relays. 
8.Attack with IPv4 broadcast address: In the 6 to 4 
mechanisms, some packets with the destination addresses 
spoofed and mapped to their broadcast addresses of the 6to4 
or relay routers are sent to the target routers by the attackers 
in the IPv6 network.In this case also 6 to 4 or relay routers 
are attacked by the broadcast addresses. 
The security issues in tunneling mechanisms can generally 
limited by investigating the validness of the 
source/destination address at each tunnel end point.Usually 
in tunneling techniques it is easier to avoid ingress filtering 
checks. Sometime it is possible to send packets having link-
local addresses and hop-limit=255,which can be used to 
attack subnet hosts from the remote node, but it is very 
difficult to deal with attacks with legal IP addresses 
now[26].Since the tunnel end points of configuration tunnels 
are fixed, so IPSec can be used to avoid spoofed 
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attacks[29].IPv6 Security issues even though it has provided 
lot off features but its known that automatic tunneling are 
dangerous as other end points are unspecified because it’s 
very difficult to prevent automatic tunneling mechanisms   
DoS/reflect-DoS attacks by the attackers in IPv4 network. 
VI. Recommendations 
The conceptual ease of Tunneling mechanism deployment 
has resulted in it becoming one of the most popular transition 
methods. This Journal paper presents an overview of the 
protocols and technologies needed to secure current IPv6 
Tunneling deployment, including basic security models, in 
addition to investigating and predicting future security 
models.The following section helps us to summarize all the 
key recommendations made throughout this paper to avoid 
IPv6 Tunneling techniques threats like Automatic and 
Configuration Tunneling.In addition to this,a general 
guideline is presented for a network administrator to take 
through each stage of deployment. 
A.Immediate Actions to take before IPv6 deployment 
1.When the Tunneled IPv6 is encapsulated in the 
following ways. 
 1.1:By using an IPv4 Header:Administrators who have not 
deployed IPv6 must first ensure that it is not being 
maliciously used without their knowledge.We know that 
6to4,ISATAP,Tunnel Broker traffic is IPv6 traffic tunneled 
using an IPv4 header that has the IP protocol field set to 
41.To protect from such traffic filter all the traffic with the IP  
protocol set to 41 set in an IPv4 header will prevent known 
IPv6 traffic from being tunneled within IPv4,thus preventing  
any back doors from being created within the network 
However,tunnels can also be set up over UDP,HTTP(port 
and so on,so the author recommends to use an IDS to 
carefully detect and monitor all tunneled traffic for instances 
of IPv6 traffic. 
1.2:By using an IPv4 header and a UDP header:If  is  an IPv6  
traffic is  a IPv6 teredo traffic[Also called as(IPv4 network 
address translator(NAT-T) traversal (NAT-T) for IPv6 
provides address and automatic tunneling for IPv6 
connectivity across IPv4 Internet even when the IPv6/IPv4 
hosts are located behind one or multiple IPv4 
NAT’S]assignment and tunneled using an IPv6 header and a 
UDP port 3544.To protect from such Treed traffic 
drop(filter)all the traffic with the Source or Destination UDP 
port to set to 3544.The below figure-18 shows a figure of  
Teredo traffic(NAT-T) 
 
                         Fig.XVIII.Teredo Traffic (NAT-T Traffic). 
1.3:By using an 6 to 4 static tunneling 6 to 4 is an address 
assignment automatic tunneling technology that is used to 
provide IPv6 connectivity between IPv6 sites and hosts 
across the IPv4 internet] instead of  the specified tunneling 
techniques[Ref.fig-19.] 
 Fig.XIX.6-to-4 Static Tunneling. 
VII.The Current and future Innovative research 
challenges of IPv6 threat issues for Researchers. 
This paper has not considered the overall threat review of 
IPv6 for all the aspects like dual stack,tunneling 
mechanisms,and Header Translation which are large and 
complex topics.To provide a complete overview of IPv6 
security this paper should be in conjunction with the IPv6 to 
IPv4 threat review with tunneling considerations.The most 
important area to move forward with in IPv6 security is the 
extension of current IPv6 Firewalls and Network tools  to 
test them(IPv6 packet constructors ,IDS’s and so on).This 
will allow more users to adopt IPv6 without being paranoid 
about their openness to attack.  
Before formulating analysis,we have proposed(formulated) 
several innovative research challenges.Presently there have 
been plenty of studies done on the research about basic 
security issues of IPv6, threat issues of IPv6, however there 
are still so many problems not yet resolved yet,calling for 
great challenges ahead.The innovative research challenges 
of IPv6 threat issues are as follows.  
1.Notion of the system identification within an 
organization: With the advent of privacy extensions and the 
size of IPv6 ranges in use, identifying systems within an 
organization and in particular identifying mis behaving. 
2.Transition mechanisms from IPv4 to IPv6:The current 
research on the basic transition mechanisms mostly focus on 
the  situation of IPv6 over IPv4.Due to advanced 
deployment of IPv6,the IPv4 networks may also be 
separated by IPv6 ones. We are using only few kinds of 
method in this situation like IPv4 configuration tunnel and 
DSTM,more research on IPv4 over IPv6 transition methods 
is necessary. 
3.Increased dependence on multicast addresses in IPv6 
could have some interesting implications with flooding 
attacks. For example all routers and NTP servers have site 
specific multicast addresses. Can we use site specific 
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multicast addresses to create an amplification attacks as 
similar as to the smurf attacks in IPv4. 
4.We know that neighbor discovery is a new addition to the 
IPv6 to replace ARP and RARP of IPv4 and also it is an 
essential component of a well-run IPv6 network it should be 
tested from a security point like a neighbor-discovery cache 
fall victim to a resource starvation attack in any of the 
currently deployed neighbor discovery implementations. 
Can the CPU of a device be exhausted by processing 
information of IPv6 neighbor discovery? 
5.IPv6 is new and security information on the protocol is not 
widespread, it is the opinion of all the authors that a large 
number of dual stack hosts may be more exposed to attack 
with IPv6 than in IPv4. 
6.With a new IPv6 header configuration, new extension 
headers, and ICMP message types there may be a several 
novel ways to deal with flooding attacks. 
7.Scenario Analysis:Typical Scenario analysis is still in 
progress. Some of them are in draft mode, such as enterprise 
network analysis along with this other possible scenarios 
should also be analyzed to support for next coming future 
wireless technologies. 
8.Support of Any cast,multihoming,multicast and 
Mobility:All the research on basic transition mechanisms 
and analysis of typical transition scenarios normally focus 
on network connection. More effort should be made for the 
long process IPv6 transition to support multihoming, 
mobility, any cast and multicast. 
9.Security considerations:All the IPv6 tunneling 
techniques are introducing more security however these 
problems cannot be settled or solved now a days. Besides 
the IPv6 firewall technology is also a good innovative topic 
for the future research. 
10.Difficult to identify Software and setup:The various 
initialization of protocols of different transition issues like 
dual stack ,tunneling issues like automatic tunneling and 
configuration tunneling and header translation security make 
the chosen and setup of suitable IPv6 transition mechanisms 
difficult and  more complex.A Standard way to discover and 
setup the software’s for connecting the IPv6 networks across 
IPv4 only network and vice versa is needed for the 
interoperation of IPv4 and IPv6. 
VIII.Conclusion 
This paper  has  shown both benefits and drawbacks  from a 
security point of view.Many of the IPv4 threats (attacks)are similar 
to the IPv6 threats (attacks) but they are different in the way they 
are applied.All the tunneling techniques described here are useful 
in one way or another however they have different usage according 
to the type of network and the intended use of the tunnel.This 
paper outlines many of the common known threats against IPv4 
and IPv6 and then it compares and contrasts how these threats 
issues or similar ones,might affect an IPv6 network.Automatic 
tunneling is also useful to provide hosts without support of their 
ISP with IPv6.Reading this paper should also stimulate further 
innovation ideas regarding the further research in IPv6 
security.This paper has also shown IPv6 has both benefits and 
drawbacks from a security perspective. Many of the attacks 
applicable to principles of IPv6, but different in the way that they 
are applied. Sagacity of the presence of IPv6 and its corresponding 
transition methods is often enough to arm network administrators 
with enough information to thwart common attacks.This paper also 
has introduced us to the security issues and candidate best practices 
surrounding the introduction of IPv6 into a network with or 
without IPSec.Due to the prevalence of current Internet, the 
transition from IPv4 to IPv6 couldn’t be accomplished in a short 
time.Besides the scarcity of IPv6 key applications IPv6 key 
applications makes no enough impetus to deploy IPv6 network.As 
a result, the transition to IPv6 is a long process.Threat estimation 
of IPv6 automatic and configuration tunneling can provide 
powerful security issues faster.As for 
UoM,Manasagangothri; the threat issues transition model is 
relatively very easy to understand tunneling threats. 
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